Politics and the Praise of Women:
Political Doctrine in the Courtier's Third Book

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The sixteenth century in Europe was one of reduced political options.1 Monarchy was in the ascendant almost everywhere. Here and there, older traditions of feudal aristocracy, civic autonomy, and republicanism retained some vigor, but the pressures tending to focus power in the figure of a strong central monarch and his court dominated the age. As a result, a young man of political virtue and ambition, taking his bearings around 1500 in Milan, Naples, Vienna, Paris, or London (and a bit later in Madrid), saw two main paths open before him: to become a prince or a courtier. Only a rare young man, obviously, found in circumstances or in himself what it took to become a prince. For him the century produced, by its second decade, a book of instruction that stands out above all other such books written before or after: Machiavelli's Prince. For the others the young men of ambition whose virtue had not been transformed into virtù or whose spirit was simply of a different order—there appeared, about the same time as the Prince, another preeminent guide to conduct: Castiglione's Book of the Courtier. It is said that the Emperor Charles V, who seems to have grasped as well as anyone the peculiar character of the age, kept both these books along with the Bible by his bedside. Perhaps he thought of the Prince and the Courtier as repositories of an essential political wisdom analogous to the spiritual

wisdom of Holy Scripture. Indeed, the *Courtier* and the *Prince* might be considered the fundamental political testaments of the sixteenth century.

That the Courtier is in some sense a political book will be readily granted; it instructs in the arts of getting along at court and thus reflects the political realities of the age. But can the book be described as political in the strict sense of the word? Does Castiglione offer more than a superficial examination of the essential fact of sixteenth-century politics: princely rule itself? Does he provide any truly practical suggestions about how courtiers ought to participate in that rule? The Courtier invites these questions. At the beginning of the fourth book we are told that the courtier's highest duty consists in teaching his prince to be a better ruler (4.5). We are told further that the courtier must couch his teaching in a cautious, oblique style (4.9–10). What the content of that teaching should be, however, remains disappointingly vague. Beyond a few pious generalities—a prince must be temperate and virtuous (4.16), must participate in the contemplative as well as the active life (4.26), must obey the laws and set a good example (4.33), and must reward the good while punishing the bad (4.34)—book 4 has nothing to say about the actual business of ruling. Such truisms hardly constitute an adequate guide to the slippery and dangerous world of Cesare Borgia and Julius II. Must we conclude, then, that the preeminent book about courtiers is radically deficient, that it fails precisely when it comes to the most important matter, to the courtier's function as political counselor? I think not. In this essay I shall try to demonstrate that the Courtier does in fact supply practical political instruction aimed at preparing courtiers who must guide princes. I intend to assert Castiglione's claim as a serious writer of political doctrine.

My approach will be to focus on what might at first seem an unlikely element in the *Courtier*'s structure: the discussion of women in the third book. One might expect the attempt to describe the court lady, which induces the company to turn away from the courtier himself at the end of the second book,

to lead to something quite different from politics—to the social graces, perhaps, or chastity, or courtly love. While touching on all these matters, however, the third book also contains an extended commentary on rule. Indeed, it is the most truly political of the Courtier's four books. It goes directly to the heart of sixteenth-century politics and raises the most searching question about the courtier's function. Beneath the camouflage of the court lady and assorted tales of good women, the third book reveals the fundamental orientation of Castiglione's political thought. As we shall see, that thought is not so different from Machiavelli's as most commentators have concluded or assumed.2 The Courtier's political doctrine cannot be reduced to dully edifying platitudes; it is informed by a spirit of boldness, flexibility, and pragmatism. At the same time, book 3 enables us to establish some important distinctions between Castiglione's boldness and pragmatism and those of his less moderate Florentine contemporary. Castiglione's readiness to fight evil on its own terms, "to make good use of the beast as well as the man," is restrained by a firmly traditional sense of limits. Because his affinity with Machiavelli has not been understood, the originality and vigor of Castiglione's allegiance to tradition have also been missed.

The third book opens with an analogy that hints at the political seriousness of what follows. Castiglione first describes the ingenuity by which Pythagoras was able to determine the probable size of the body of Hercules. Since the Olympic stadium at Elis was known to be 625 times as long as Hercules' foot, while other stadiums were 625 times as long as the foot of an ordinary man, Pythagoras concluded that Hercules' body must have been larger than an ordinary man's body in the same proportion as the stadium at Elis was larger than other stadiums. "Thus you," Castiglione goes on, addressing Alfonso Ariosto, "by the same reasoning may clearly know, from this small part of the whole, how superior the Court of Urbino was to all others in Italy, considering how much these games, which were devised for the relaxation of minds wearied by more arduous endeavors, were superior to those practiced in the other

courts of Italy. And if these were such, imagine what the other worthy pursuits were to which our minds were bent and wholly given over" (3.1). Through this analogy the Courtier reminds its readers that the games it records, refined and fascinating though they are, do not represent the real business of courtiers. Those games may, as some critics have suggested, provide an image of the workings of a high civilization, with its love of style, its sublimated eroticism and aggression, its cult of individual perfection.4 As a social and political organization, however, no court is self-sufficient; ultimately, no court justifies itself in itself but rather in its role as head and heart of a larger social and political structure where courtly gentility does not predominate, where sublimation and a sense of style cannot be depended upon to create order. In this greater and harsher world, men have to be ruled; the heroic energy and force of a Hercules (the whole man, not just his foot) are needed. To the portrait of the courtier's foot, furnished by books 1 and 2, the third book's discussion of women adds the rest of the body, especially the head, heart, and strong right arm.

After some preliminary uncertainty, discussion on the third night settles into the Magnifico Giuliano de' Medici's attempt to describe a court lady who can be considered the equal of the courtier as he has emerged from the first two books. Initially the description proceeds along familiar lines established during the previous nights. The Magnifico makes passing reference to practically every virtue known to moral and political philosophy but locates the court lady's specific excellence in "a certainpleasing affability... whereby she will be able to entertain graciously every kind of man with agreeable and comely conversation suited to the time and place and to the station of the person with whom she speaks" (3.5). Challenges from Gaspar Pallavicino, however, soon force abandonment of this neatly limited approach. Some of these challenges simply reflect Gaspar's role, which he obviously relishes, as the group's sacrificial misogynist but others cannot be so easily dismissed. At one point, drawing attention to the disparity between the Magnifico's casual references to the highest virtues and his stress on "affability," Gaspar remarks, "Since you have granted letters and continence and magnanimity and temperance to women, I am quite surprised that you do not wish them to govern cities, make laws, lead armies, and let the men stay home to cook and spin" (3.10). The Magnifico promptly replies, "Perhaps that would not be so bad either," and finds himself drawn rapidly into a discussion that cuts through mere affability to serious intellectual, moral, and political issues.

At first the discussion takes the form of an abstract and almost scholastic debate over the nature of women. Gaspar unlimbers some of the big guns in the arsenal of traditional misogyny: woman is a "defect" or "accident" of nature; man can be compared to "form" and woman to "matter," and since "form" is superior to "matter" man must be considered superior to woman; men are by temperament warm, women cold, and "warmth is far more noble and more perfect than cold." To each of these and other similar points, the Magnifico offers a careful and thoroughly convincing rebuttal (3.11–19). There can be no doubt that here and elsewhere the Courtier asserts the dignity of women and their essential equality with men. In itself, of course, this assertion amounts to a political teaching of great consequence, and among the Courtier's many influences on later European civilization, its contribution to an increasing recognition of, and respect for, women might be traced. Within the dramatic economy of the dialogue, moreover, the Magnifico's skillful rebuttal of misogyny serves to raise him above the general run of Urbino's courtiers. We see for the first time the qualities of mind that establish him in the course of book 3 as one of Castiglione's chief spokesmen—a figure comparable in authority to Ottaviano Fregoso or Pietro Bembo. In addition, the Magnifico's demonstration that both sexes must be considered equally capable of virtue serves as a necessary preparation for what follows: his elaboration of a series of tales about good women into a vehicle for political ideas intended to have a general applicability to both sexes.

Between the demonstration and the tales, however, the Magnifico introduces a digression that is of great importance for

understanding the design of book 3. Lamenting the plight of women whose goodness remains unknown "because the poor creatures are kept shut in," the Magnifico suddenly launches into a tirade against a certain group of "accursed hypocrites among men," who by their wiles win a false reputation for piety and virtue. These hypocrites make a show of holiness, going about with bowed heads and ragged habits, while in fact they are bent upon seductions, forgeries, murders, treacheries, and "every sort of villainy." The Magnifico refrains from naming the group he means but his unstated point is not lost upon Emilia Pia. She promptly identifies the object of his attack as the friars and reproaches him for speaking ill of them. "Then," Castiglione tells us, "the Magnifico laughed and said: 'How, Madam, have you guessed so well that I was speaking of friars when I did not name them?" (3.20). Through this digression Castiglione alerts us to a dimension of the Magnifico's rhetoric that is essential to an interpretation of his stories about women. He knows how to speak through hints and implications; he does not always make his main point explicit. To catch his full intention we must, like Emilia Pia, be prepared to perceive what is implied clearly enough even when it is not named.

Of the Magnifico's stories of good women, some amount to little more than the citation of a famous name; others are presented in enough detail to be understood even by a reader unfamiliar with their sources. The latter are the more revealing. Although all support the contention that women are capable of the highest virtue, the more fully developed stories illustrate the particular qualities that not only women, but men too, need in order to rule and function as advisers to rulers. In the very first of these stories the Magnifico confronts the young courtier abruptly with the political world that awaits him beyond the sheltering walls of the palace. In compiling a list of women who "have been as worthy of praise as the great men whose wives or sisters or daughters they were," the Magnifico first names several well-known Roman ladies and then extols at length the "prudence" of Alexandra, wife of Alexander, King of the Jews (3.22). After the death of the tyrannical Alexander,

the people rose in arms, eager to revenge themselves by killing his children. Grasping the danger, Alexandra acted promptly, boldly, and effectively. She had her husband's body thrown into the public square and addressed the mob, commiserating with them, inviting them to tear her husband to pieces and feed him to the dogs but begging them "to have mercy on her innocent children." Her words "were so effective that the fierce wrath prevailing in the minds of all the people was at once mitigated and converted to such a feeling of pity that with one accord they not only chose those children as their rulers, but they even gave a most honorable burial to the body of the dead man." Alexandra's story carries with it the bracing odor of the real world of power and violence—an odor that pervades the Prince but that has been for the most part absent from the Courtier up to this point. Alexandra is faced not with the obstreperousness of a Gaspar but with an enraged mob, out for her children's and perhaps her own, blood. And she triumphs not through learned wit and charming raillery but by confronting ruthlessness with ruthlessness, by boldly and impiously encouraging a mob to desecrate her husband's body in the hope that this will satisfy their passions and win them to her side. Her bold impiety, which the Magnifico characterizes as "prudence," succeeds. Here is a tale to be pondered by courtiers who would instruct princes. The Magnifico does not call attention to the fact that his very first extended example of a virtuous woman introduces a new and more realistic tone into the discussion. As in his description of the friars, he lets the style and substance of his account speak for themselves. At least one of his reasons for such indirectness can be readily understood. Speaking ill of friars may arouse Emilia; to describe as "prudence" Alexandra's throwing her husband's body to the mob (even granting that he was a tyrant) might be considered much more subversive. It implies that ordinary decency may be irrelevant and even a hindrance to the real business of ruling.

Many of the stories that follow prompt similar reflections. A thread of political realism and pragmatism runs throughout the Magnifico's examples, distinguishing book 3 from the rest

of the Courtier as well as from conventional handbooks of politics and courtesy. When the Magnifico recounts how the Trojan women with Aeneas "helped in the founding of Rome," his tale stresses not only their benefaction but also the trickery by which it was achieved (3.29). The fugitives from Troy had landed near the mouth of the Tiber. While the men were away in search of provisions, the women, who were weary of traveling and had remained behind, burned the ships so that their husbands would not be able to reembark. Thus the men were forced to accede to the wishes of the women and to found the city that became Rome. In fact, the Magnifico asserts, following Plutarch, the very name of the city honors a certain Roma, the leader of this female meeting.<sup>5</sup> From an act of conjugal deception, an act that would be blameworthy on moral grounds, it appears that salutary political consequences as well as fame may result. A student of the ways in which courtiers should deal with princes might also remark in this story about women the implication that such deception can be especially helpful when the weak seek to influence the strong.

From the story of Rome's founding, the Magnifico proceeds immediately to the story of its preservation through the Sabine women. Of the various rapes by which Romulus supplied the city with women, the Magnifico comments simply—and rather surprisingly in view of his role as a defender of women—that Romulus succeeded in most of them "since he was a man of ability" (3.30). As is well known, however, the Sabines were less easily exploited than some of their neighbors. The Sabines attacked Rome in an effort to free the captured women, and the battle was still undecided when the women themselves rushed between the armies and persuaded them to lay down their weapons. The Magnifico lauds the Sabine women's "piety and wisdom" in thus accepting their rape and in reconciling the men of their native city to the fait accompli. Furthermore, he goes on to describe how Romulus repaid those "wise and courageous women": "When he divided the people into thirty wards, he gave to these the names of Sabine women." Here again, as in his accounts of Alexandra and the Trojan women,

the Magnifico delicately, but nonetheless clearly, indicates that political success requires a degree of freedom from morality. From a political perspective, "piety," "wisdom," and the acquisition of fame may depend upon ignoring the strict demands of honor and justice, not to speak of chastity.

Christianity too, the Magnifico indicates, may be politically enfeebling. The story about "a gentleman in Pisa whose name was messer Tommaso," his wife madonna Argentina, and his son Paolo (3.27) can be read as a warning to the courtier against the tendency to rely upon Providence rather than one's own strength and skill. On a trip to Sicily messer Tommaso had fallen into the hands of Barbary pirates. In defending himself before his capture, he had killed the brother of a pirate captain, and in revenge the victors had determined to hold him without ransom. Freed prisoners returning from North Africa had informed madonna Argentina of her husband's sufferings, and all had concluded that his situation was hopeless "unless God should miraculously help him." Messer Tommaso himself had come to accept his enslavement. At that point, however, "it came to pass that a sedulous piety so spurred the wit and daring of one of his sons, whose name was Paolo, that the youth took no thought of any kind of danger and resolved that he would either die or free his father; and in this he succeeded and brought him out so secretly that he was in Leghorn before it was known in Barbary that he had escaped." Unfortunately, the unexpected joy of this event proved too intense for madonna Argentina; upon learning the news, she "raised her eyes to heaven and, calling her husband's name, fell dead." Ostensibly this story illustrates women's capacity for faithful love. In fact, the Magnifico's telling focuses not on madonna Argentina's passive faith but on the vigor and self-reliance of Paolo. When everyone else had decided that only a miracle could save his father, Paolo took matters into his own hands. His "sedulous piety" was not of the kind that resigns everything into God's hands—the kind that Machiavelli thought had so debilitated the ancient virtue in Italian hearts.<sup>6</sup> Paolo's was a "piety" that exercised itself in "wit and daring." Only that kind,

the Magnifico leads his readers to infer, is of practical political value in a world infested by pirates.

Consistent with the implications of the story of messer Tommaso is the emphasis on arms that emerges from a proportionally large number of the Magnifico's examples.7 He introduces the theme with two stories about the women of Chios (3.32). The first tells how they were so angered by an insulting enemy that they took arms and overcame him themselves when their husbands proved unable to do so. The second extols their fierce independence in adversity. Having been defeated by the Erythraeans, the men of Chios agreed to depart into exilé "dressed only in their cloaks and tunics." When the women learned of the agreement, however, they reproached the men for abandoning their weapons and persuaded them "to leave their clothes behind and to carry their shields and spears; and to tell the enemy that these were their attire. And so," the Magnifico concludes, "following their women's advice, they undid in great part the shame from which they could not entirely escape." Later stories underline the political lesson. The Magnifico assembles an impressive collection of women who benefited their countries because they understood (often better than their men) the need for martial virtue: Persian women who shamed a routed Persian army into returning to battle (3.32); Spartan women "who rejoiced in the glorious death of their sons . . . who disowned or even slew their sons when they saw them act like cowards" (3.33); women of Saguntum who fought against Hannibal (3.33); Pisan women "who in the defense of their city against the Florentines showed that generous courage, without any fear whatever of death, which the most unconquerable spirits that ever lived on earth might have shown" (3.36); Queen Isabella of Spain, to whom "alone is the honor of the glorious conquest of the kingdom of Granada to be attributed" (3.35).

Behind these and the Magnifico's other stories in book 3 lies, it is true, no systematic political program—no blueprint for uniting Italy against the barbarians, no scheme for revitalizing Italian arms, not even a comprehensive list of the virtues necessary for rule. Rather, the Magnifico's political teaching seems to

aim at the inculcation of certain fundamental insights and attitudes essential to political success. Above all, it seems, the courtier, and the prince whom he instructs, must not allow the elegant, civilized sublimations of the court to obscure the fact that cruder passions and ugly dangers inform the outside world of politics; those passions and those dangers cannot be laughed away with raillery but must be subdued by bold cunning and force. Both the courtier and the prince must know how to confront brutality on its own terms; they must be prepared to fight ruthlessness with ruthlessness, to counter strength with strength, or with deception, to make the best of indecent necessities, and to depend upon themselves instead of Providence. They must cultivate freedom from too fastidious a morality and from the potential enervation of piety.

In view of the bold and potentially shocking character of this political teaching, Castiglione's decision to camouflage it in the rhetoric of a character adept at speaking obliquely is understandable. To express such ideas openly would have been imprudent for a man who was himself a courtier moving in the highest circles and who was serving, at the time of the book's publication, as papal nuncio to the court of Charles V. Selfprotection, however, does not provide a complete explanation of the third book's subtle art. Castiglione's indirection also reflects the essential conservatism that informs the Courtier as a whole—the love of style, the respect for the decorous and decent, and the idealism that are such striking features of the work's surface texture. Unlike Machiavelli, Castiglione does not revel in the harsh, ugly, and shocking facts of life. He is fully aware of those facts and realizes that they must be understood by courtiers who advise rulers, but he refuses to engage in an assault upon traditional values and pieties in the name of realism. By concealing rather than trumpeting his view that those traditional vaues and pieties are sometimes politically inadequate, Castiglione upholds them, albeit in a qualified manner. Praise of constancy, love, continence, chastity, and the values of the classical-Christian synthesis carries a dominant weight throughout book 3 and the rest of the Courtier, in spite of the

Magnifico's indications that a darker knowledge too is needful. Machiavelli takes his political bearings by the extreme cases of brutality—Romulus's murder of Remus, Hannibal's "inhuman cruelty," and Cesare Borgia's *virtù* at Sinigaglia; Castiglione wants courtiers to meditate upon such cases and grasp their implications for the problem of ruling but not to make them an excuse for the abandonment of established values. For Castiglione virtù appears to complement, but does not replace, virtue.

Indeed, one of the Magnifico's longest and most impressive stories (the story of Camma [3.26]) is designed to stress this point and to suggest the limits that a courtier must try to impose upon a ruler's freedom to deviate from conventional norms. Camma was a very beautiful married woman who had the ill luck to arouse the lust of a certain Sinoris, a man "who was almost tyrant of the city where they lived." Having tried in vain every means of seduction, Sinoris finally had Camma's husband murdered and offered to marry her. She refused, but her parents, impressed by the advantages of such a match as well as the dangers of refusing it, kept urging her to reconsider. At last she pretended to accept and on the wedding day took her revenge with a poisoned drink she had prepared: "Before Diana's image and in the presence of Sinoris, she drank half of it; then with her own hand (for such was the custom at marriages) she gave the rest to the groom, who drank it all." Before dying herself, she had the satisfaction of learning that the tyrant had already expired. In light of the worldly pragmatism that informs so many of his stories, the Magnifico's moralizing tone, with no hint of ulterior meanings, surprises here. The predicament of Camma might remind us of the Sabine women whose adaptation to an advantageous rape the Magnifico approves, and Sinoris might seem not so different from the enterprising and apparently unscrupulous Romulus. However, a crucial dissimilarity separates the two stories. Both Romulus and the Sabine women acted as they did for truly political ends—the preservation of the city—whereas Sinoris had nothing in view beyond his private pleasure, and nothing except personal advantage could have resulted from Camma's acquiescence. By censuring Sinoris while approving Camma's firm rejection of moral compromise, the Magnifico establishes the standard that must control the doctrine of pragmatism that he teaches elsewhere. That doctrine is strictly political in scope; it is not meant to provide an excuse for private greed and lust. For the Magnifico, only the public good—true political necessity—can justify deviations from strict morality.

One detail in the story of Camma indicates, furthermore, that the Magnifico's teaching about the limits of pragmatism has a special pertinence for courtiers. Sinoris is described as "almost the tyrant of the city." We learn that he is able to arrange for the murder of Camma's husband and to use his rank to intimidate her parents. In resisting him, Camma resists not simply private lust but the lust of a public man who is willing to exploit his public position for private ends. Among other lessons, the Magnifico's praise of Camma conveys a subtle encouragement to resist tyranny. The importance of this lesson within the Magnifico's political teaching as a whole is revealed by the fact that resistance to tyranny appears as the theme of two of his other stories: the stories of Epicharis and of Leona (3.23). According to the Magnifico, Epicharis was "a Roman freedwomen, who, being privy to a great conspiracy against Nero, was of such constancy that, although racked by the worst tortures imaginable, she never betrayed any of her accomplices; whereas many noble knights and senators, in the same peril, timorously accused brothers, friends, and the dearest and nearest they had in the world." To Leona, the Athenians "dedicated a tongueless lioness (leona) in bronze before the gate of the citadel" because she too endured torture without betraying a plot against tyranny. Near the beginning of the Courtier's fourth book, Ottaviano Fregoso pronounces a stern judgment on "the princes of today," describing them as full of "extreme self-conceit," interested only in power, and antagonistic toward "reason" and "justice" (4.6–9). He might be describing Sinoris; such princes are plainly tyrants. Nevertheless, Ottaviano remains apparently optimistic that many of them can be changed for the better by the gentle and artful persuasion that he recommends to courtiers (4.9–10, 47).<sup>10</sup> The stories of Camma, Epicharis, and Leona suggest that the Magnifico does not share this optimism. There are times, these stories warn, when a courtier will have to resist tyranny by force, will have to put the arts of courtiership per se—the jousting, the dancing, the loving, even the giving of good counsel—behind him and call upon sterner political virtues. At such times, concern for the common good must weigh more heavily than any merely pragmatic consideration of personal advancement. Like the good women whom the Magnifico praises, the courtier must be prepared to be killed and to kill; he must exhibit the heroic spirit of Hercules, who, according to Ottaviano, "waged perpetual and deadly war" against tyranny (4.37).<sup>11</sup>

Now we are in a position to grasp even more clearly the prudential considerations that underlie Castiglione's concealment of his teaching about rule. Exhorting courtiers to tyrannicide not only contradicts the Courtier's prevailing emphasis on the normal rather than the extreme cases but also subverts the fundamental understandings on which a book of advice to courtiers rests. When courtiers turn rebels they cease to be courtiers. The Magnifico's praise of Camma, Epicharis, and Leona leads ultimately to an understanding of the limits of courtiership, to an awareness of the point beyond which one cannot be both a good courtier and a good man. The Magnifico's instruction in the bold pragmatism necessary to rule is not, it seems, intended only as advice to be passed on to princes. Such instruction also provides courtiers with the understanding that they will need to combat tyrants. Indeed, it might not be too much to say that the Magnifico intends to provide courtiers with the understanding necessary in the extreme case to make themselves princes. These are dangerous ideas, especially in light of Ottaviano's description of the tyrannical proclivities of "the princes of today." One wonders what Charles V thought as he reflected upon the Magnifico's tales of good women. If that prince penetrated the third book's veiled political doctrine, perhaps he recognized the benign as well as the self-protective motive behind the veiling. Perhaps his own experience and position made him sympathetic to the political temper of a man who looked unflinchingly at the base facts that absorbed Machiavelli, who acknowledged the necessity implicit in those facts, but who still preserved an allegiance to the humane ideals of tradition. Of course there is no way to know exactly what Charles made of the *Courtier*, but if we bear in mind the dimension of the book that has been described here, we may discover a special poignancy in the eulogy that we are told the emperor pronounced upon learning of Castiglione's death: "Yo vos digo que es muerto uno de los mejores caballeros del mundo" ["I tell you that he who is dead was one of the greatest gentlemen in the world"].

## NOTES

1. For fuller accounts of the political situation described in the opening paragraph of this essay, see H. G. Koenigsberger and George L. Mosse, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1968), pp. 212–44 (there is a useful bibliography on pp. 212–13); Denys Hay, *The Renaissance: 1493–1520*, New Cambridge Modern History, I, ed. Denys Hay (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 5–10; and G. R. Elton, "Constitutional Development and Political Thought in Western Europe," in *The Reformation: 1520–1559*, New Cambridge Modern History, II, ed. G. R. Elton (Cambridge, 1958), 438–63. Cf. Lauro Martines, "The Gentleman in Renaissance Italy: Strains of Isolation in the Body Politic," in *The Darker Vision of the Renaissance: Beyond the Fields of Reason*, UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Contributions, VI, ed. Robert S. Kinsman (Berkeley, 1974), 77–81.

2. See Ralph Roeder, The Man of the Renaissance (New York, 1933), pp. 213–312; Erich Loos, Baldessare Castigliones "Libro del Cortigiano": Studien zur Tugendauffassungen des Cinquecento (Analecta Romanica, II; Frankfurt am Main, 1955), 26, 72–156, 183–210; Alfredo Bonadeo, "The Function and Purpose of the Courtier in The Book of the Courtier by Castiglione," Philological Quarterly, 50 (1971), 36–46; and Martines, "Gentleman in Renaissance Italy," pp. 87–93.

3. See the *Prince*, trans. and ed. Mark Musa (New York, 1964), chap. 18, p. 145: "You should know, then, that there are two ways of fighting: one with the law, the other with force: the first way is peculiar to man, the other to beasts; but since the first in many instances is not enough, it becomes necessary to resort to the second. Therefore, a prince must know how to make good use of the beast and the man."

4. See especially the excellent work of Wayne A. Rebhorn: "Ottaviano's Interruption: Book IV and the Problem of Unity in Il Libro del Cortegiano,"

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Modern Language Notes, 87 (1972), 37–59, and Courtly Performances: Masking and Festivity in Castiglione's Book of the Courtier (Detroit, 1978).

- 5. Plutarch, "Mulierum Virtutes," in Moralia (243F), ed. F. Dübner (Paris, 1861), 1, 301.
- 6. See especially Machiavelli's discussion of the connection between religion and political liberty in *Discourses* 3.2.
- 7. Cf. the *Prince*'s stress on possessing arms of one's own (especially chaps. 6, 7, 12–14, 24).
- 8. Cf. J. R. Hale's remarks on Castiglione's lack of military experience (pp. 146–59, below).
- 9. See the *Prince*, chaps. 7 (Sinigaglia), 17 (Hannibal's "inhuman cruelty"), and *Discourses* 1.9 (Romulus's murder of Remus).
- 10. That Ottaviano's optimism is not unqualified is indicated by his remark that "if I had the favor of some of the princes I know, and if I were to tell them freely what I think, I fear I should soon lose that favor" (4.26). See Thomas M. Greene's comment on this passage (pp. 12–13, above).
- 11. Ottaviano's reference to Hercules' fame as a destroyer of tyrants aims explicity at inspiring princes. Coming to the passage after an attentive reading of book 3, however, one cannot help reflect that courtiers too may emulate Hercules.